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The International Effects
of the
Adoption of a Consumption Tax in the
United States
ABSTRACT

This Note concludes that through the adoption of a
consumption tax the United States will benefit from both shortand long-term gains. This Note presents the advantages of
consumption taxes and where relevant, discusses a specific
consumption tax proposal-the Fairtax Plan. The Author
responds to several critiques of consumption taxation, including
whether consumption taxes are disproportionately placed on
labor, the existence of efficiency gains, the internationaleffects,
increasedblack market activity, and cross-border tax arbitrage.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, national governments structured their tax systems
without accounting for international investment levels. Until
recently, tax regimes were, by and large, a purely domestic issue, but
as increased globalization dissolved barriers to free capital flows, the
concerns of tax policy changed. 1 Modern advances in areas such as
transportation and communication have helped free capital, an
important part of any government's tax base, from its geographical
roots. For instance, between 1973 and 1995, global capital transfers
increased by a multiple of eighty. 2 The increasingly vast resources
involved in the global market required a new understanding of tax
policy.
As the prior century progressed, new technologies spurred policy
3
changes worldwide, increasing the opportunities to invest abroad.
The Industrial Revolution led to advances in transportation
technology, such as the railroad, spurring economic growth and
increasing "incentives for capital formation, industrial concentration,
international specialization, and for labor and capital migration."4
Beginning in the 1970s, developed countries instituted policies that
led to the drastic reduction of limitations on the international flow of
capital. 5 Developing countries have changed their policies even more
drastically; once suspicious of foreign investment, most developing
nations currently view foreign investment as beneficial. 6 Changes in
legislation continue to show an emphatic favoring of foreign
investment: 93% of legislation in 2001 affecting international
investment created more favorable conditions for investing. 7
Increasingly mobile capital has raised concerns with some critics
over the continued ability of governments to use traditional means of
taxation.8 Economic studies confirm that the combination of
globalization, domestic economic stress, and budgetary imperatives

1.
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, HARMFUL
TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 13-14 (1998), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/1904176.pdf [hereinafter HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION].
See Mitchell B. Weiss, International Tax Competition: An Efficient or
2.
Inefficient Phenomenon?, 16 AKRON TAX J. 99, 105, 107, 109 (2001).
3.
ALEX EASSON, TA INCENTIVES FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 10-11
(2004).
4.
C. Knick Harley, A Review of O'Rourke and Williamson's Globalization and
History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth Century Atlantic Economy, 38 J. ECON. LIT.
926, 929-30 (2000).
5.
EASSON, supra note 3, at 10.
6. ' Id. at 10-11.
7.
Id. at 11.
Jack M. Mintz, National Tax Policy and Global Competition, 26 BROOK. J.
8.
INT'LL. 1285, 1286 (2001).
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have led to reductions in worldwide tax rates on capital.9 For
example, as of April 2005, nine countries in Eastern Europe made
themselves more attractive to global investment by lowering the rate
of taxation on capital as part of a transition to a flat tax. 10 Lower tax
rates on capital concern critics, such as Avi-Yonah, who worry that
decreasing tax rates will lower government revenues, thereby
constraining social expenditures that they deem beneficial. 1' Taxes
on capital, however, create inefficiencies in capital accumulation and
raise the relative price, and thereby reduce demand. Thus, this Note
rejects the Avi-Yonah type concerns over tax competition and
contends instead that the need for economic efficiency outweighs
concerns about the ability of governments to maintain high levels of
12
expenditures.
The lowering of taxes on capital is a form of global tax
competition, an issue which ties into a longstanding debate in the
United States over whether the federal government should continue
to use an income tax or adopt any of a variety of consumption tax
proposals.13 Under most consumption tax proposals seriously
considered by Congress, capital is either lightly taxed or not taxed at
all. 14 Compared to the current tax code-which taxes corporate
capital returns at 35%-exempting such income, as this Note
proposes, would be significant. 15 No major economy completely
exempts investment from taxation, 16 and the adoption of such a policy
by an economy the size of the United States has the potential to
dramatically raise the level of tax competition.

9.
Duane Swank & Sven Steinmo, The New Political Economy of Taxation in
Advanced CapitalisticDemocracies,46 AM. J. POL. Sci. 642, 651 (2002). But see Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare
State, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (2000) (worrying that tax competition is
threatening the solvency of countries that want to provide a social safety net).
10.
The Case for Flat Taxes, THE ECONOMIST, April 16, 2005, Special Report, at
2. Countries that have adopted flat taxes include Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Russia,
Serbia, Ukraine, Slovakia, Georgia, and Romania. Id.
11.
Avi-Yonah, supra note 9, at 1576.
12.
See, e.g., Marianne Baxter, Fiscal Policy, Specialization, and Trade in the
Two-Sector Model: The Return of Ricardo?, 100 J. POL. ECON. 713, 725-27 (1992)
(describing the effects of distortionary taxation in two sector trade between two
countries in a steady state model).
13.
See, e.g., Steven A. Bank, The Progressive Consumption Tax Revisited, 101
MICH. L. REV. 2238 (2003) (reviewing EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT: How To
MAKE THE TAX SYSTEM BETTER AND SIMPLER (2002)). See generally Alan Schenk, The

Plethora of Consumption Tax Proposals: Putting the Value Added Tax, Flat Tax, Retail
Sales Tax, and USA

Tax into Perspective, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV.

1281

(1996)

(comparing various consumption tax proposals to the current U.S. income tax system).
14.
See generally Schenk, supra note 13.
15.
26 U.S.C.S. § 11(b); 26 U.S.C.S § 1201(a)(2) (2005).
16.
Cf. EASSON, supra note 3, at 35-36 (noting that some countries do provide
exemptions for some passive investments).
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With the advent of the global economy and increased tax
competition, corporations and other investors use geographically
fungible capital to lower their tax liabilities by moving their
investments to low tax areas. 17 The potential for capital flight
imposes constraints on the level of taxation, which, in turn, imposes
fiscal discipline on governments.' 8 Several normative economic
studies have shown that the optimal tax rate on capital is zero,
whereas the optimal tax rate on labor is positive, suggesting that the
identifiable reduction of taxes on capital, through by tax competition,
would provide worldwide benefits. 19 Discipline also may lead to
reduced inefficiencies by forcing governments to streamline their tax
systems. 20 Furthermore, in a more efficient market, investment will
be allocated more productively, leading to worldwide welfare benefits
21
in the long run.
The thesis of this Note is that, should the United States replace
its current tax system with a consumption tax, global benefits would
outweigh global costs. Although the tax reform literature is thick, by
concentrating on the international effects of a consumption tax, this
Note takes a less traveled path. This Note makes an additional
contribution by focusing on House Resolution 2525, nicknamed the
"Fairtax Plan" by its supporters. The Fairtax Plan is a national sales
tax proposal. It is an economically neutral non-cascading sales tax,
under which only new goods and services are taxed. 22 The tax
literature has not fully examined the Fairtax Plan, and this Note is
an attempt to give a more complete analysis of the costs and benefits.
This Note concludes that the adoption of a national sales tax will
result in drastic change in international tax regimes and the global
economy by lessening distortions and facilitating the efficient flow of
international savings and investment.
Although this Note offers a solution to inefficiencies created by
the current international system for taxing international flows of
savings and investment, it recognizes that adoption of a consumption
tax has tradeoffs, including a failure to remove cross-border
arbitrage, thereby creating potential incentives to international
organized crime. Furthermore, this Note recognizes that valid non-

17.
HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 1, at 14.
18.
Carlo Perroni & Kimberly A. Scharf, Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax
Competition and Constitutional Choices, 68 REV. ECON. STUD. 133, 134-35 (2001).
19.
See Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti & Nouriel Roubini, Growth Effects of
Income and Consumption Taxes, 30 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 721, 723 (1998).
20.
Perroni & Scharf, supra note 18, at 134-35.
See id.
21.
22.
Americans for Fair Taxation, Fairtax Frequently Asked Questions,
1 (last visited Feb. 11,
http://www.fairtaxvolunteer.org/smart/faq-main.html#1,
2006); see Charles E. McLure, Jr., Rethinking State and Local Reliance on the Retail
Sales Tax: Should We Fix the Sales Tax or Discard It?, 2000 BYU L. REV. 77, 82-88
(2000) (describing the ideal sales tax).
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economic domestic concerns exist and, while not addressed in this
Note, should be considered along with the potential adoption of a
consumption tax.
Part II of this Note provides an overview of the international
taxation of investment. This Part investigates basic concepts in
international taxation and further develops the discussion of
international tax competition. Part III describes the current
international system and highlights the mass of inefficiencies and the
need for radical reform. Part IV describes the benefits of consumption
taxes, introducing the two dominant consumption tax systems and
the relevant advantages of the Fairtax Plan. Because the Fairtax
Plan has many of the general attributes of consumption taxation, this
Note first addresses the attributes that the Fairtax Plan has in
common with consumption tax plans. Finally, Part V addresses the
critiques of consumption taxes and answers these critiques through
the lens of the Fairtax Plan. This Part demonstrates how the
criticisms of consumption taxes have been overstated

II. OVERVIEW OF SOME PERTINENT INTERNATIONAL TAx ISSUES
A. Relevant Background
World taxation systems can be separated into two generic
23
groupings: territorial systems and worldwide residence systems.
Under a territorial system, income produced outside a country is not
taxed. 2 4 Tax systems like the U.S. tax regime are based on worldwide
residence. Thus, income earned by tax citizens, permanent residents,
and corporations is taxed regardless of where it is earned. 25 Potential
double taxation is addressed by either allowing a deduction or credit
based on the amount of foreign taxes paid. 26 The United States gives
domestic investors the option to choose to take either a tax credit or a
deduction on foreign taxes paid. 27 Deductions and credits are
limited. 28 If no limitations were in place, foreign nations could charge
high taxes with the expectation that the U.S. government would
29
reimburse U.S. corporations.

23.
Charles L. Ballard, InternationalAspects of Fundamental Tax Reform, in
UNITED STATES TAx REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 109, 110 (George R. Zodrow & Peter
Mieszkowski eds., 2002).
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
26.
Id.
27.
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 78, 275(a), 901(a) (2005).
28.
See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 904(a) (providing that total foreign tax credits cannot
exceed the total tax liability in the United States).
29.
Ballard, supra note 23, at 110.
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Processes to relieve double taxation of international investment
create incentives to manipulate the tax system, minimizing taxable
income. Corporations, within limits, can decrease their tax liability by
misclassifying income earned domestically as income produced by
foreign sources. 30 For example, the limit of foreign tax credits can be
increased by reclassifying income earned from the domestic
production of export goods as foreign-source income. 31 Also, by
transferring income to lower tax countries, total tax liability can be
reduced. 32 For example, evidence indicates that corporations use
transfer pricing to take advantage of Ireland's low tax rates, which
provides significant tax savings. 33 Tax liability can also be reduced by
manipulating interest-expense deductions. 34 Manipulation occurs
when money is borrowed for a foreign business investment in foreign
35
jurisdictions that do not allow the deduction of loan interest.
Because the United States allows the deduction of business loans,
investors are incentivized to minimize their tax liability by shifting
the loan interest to their U.S. source income. 36 The desire to minimize
taxation can lead investors to make expenditures and investments
that would be suboptimal in a taxless world.
Capital taxation also affects the form of international
investment.
Generally, a foreign investor can structure an
investment to gain tax treatment as either a resident or a nonresident. 37 Assuming no investor-specific incentives, however, both
residents and non-residents are generally taxed similarly on income
generated within a country's borders. 38 Classification can matter,
however, where differential tax rates make a particular classification
tax efficient. For example, in the United States, firms can avoid
taxation on foreign source income by reincorporating in another
country that does not tax investment income. 39

30.
Id. at 116.
31.
Id.; see, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 863.
32.
Ballard, supra note 23, at 116.
33.
Frank Barry, FDI, TransferPricing and the Measurement of R&D Intensity,
34 RES. POL'Y 673, 677-78 (2005).
34.
Ballard, supra note 23, at 117.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
EASSON, supra note 3, at 37 (providing that the form of the investment
affects the resident/non-resident determination).
38.
Peggy B. Musgrave, Consumption Tax Proposals in an International
Setting, 54 TAx L. REV. 77, 78-79 (2000) (providing that tax revenues from nonresident investors should be thought of as a lease payment, where the investor pays a
fee to benefit from advantageous production factors within the host country).
39.
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as InternationalLaw, 57 TAX L.
REV. 483, 486-87 (2004).
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B. WTO Rules
Taxation does not occur in a vacuum and tax policies can be
influenced by rules that lie outside of the tax code. At the
international level, trade rules promulgated under the World Trade
Organization (WTO) can affect domestic tax policies by setting the
ground rules for the international trade of goods. 40
The main
obligation of the WTO is to encourage nondiscrimination, meaning
that the WTO seeks to minimize and eliminate trade barriers. 41 For
example, under most circumstances, the WTO requires members to
42
award certain trade benefits to all other WTO members.
More relevant to tax policies are the WTO rules regarding border
adjustments, which provide favorable taxation rules under certain
circumstances. Border adjustments occur when a country repays a
taxpayer the amount of previously paid domestic taxes on exported
goods. 43 The rules regarding border adjustments, however, do not
allow border adjustments for all types of taxation. WTO rules allow
border adjustments for indirect taxes, which are taxes that are not
focused on a particular person, but instead are focused on an action,
such as consumption. 44 WTO rules, however, do not allow border
adjustments to be made for direct taxes, such as income taxes, which
are focused on individuals. 45 Consequently, some advocates believe
that, under GATT, countries that use direct taxation suffer a
competitive disadvantage relative to countries with indirect taxation
because of the inability to waive the domestic tax burden on
exports. 46 Some estimates of the cost reduction afforded by border
adjustments are as high as 25 to 30%.47 Therefore, these advocates
believe that because of the lower tax burden, businesses located in
countries using an indirect taxation regime are more attractive to
foreign investment and savings than businesses within countries
48
using direct taxation.

40.
WTO, GATT and the Goods Council, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
gatt-e/gatt e.htm (last visited Feb 11, 2006).
41.
Yariv Brauner, International Trade and Tax Agreements may be
Coordinated,but not Reconciled, 25 VA. TAX REV. 251, 266 (2005).
42.
Id.
43.
Laura Dale, The Economic Impact of Replacing the Federal Income Tax
with a Federal Consumption Tax: Leveling the International Playing Field, 9
CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 47, 47 (2000).
44.
Id. at 50.
45.
Cf. id. (direct tax is the converse of an indirect tax).
46.
Id.; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 187, art. III.
47.
Dale, supra note 43, at 52.
48.
Malcolm Gillis et al., Indirect Consumption Taxes: Common Issues and
Differences Among the Alternative Approaches, 51 TA L. REV. 725, 740-41 (1996).
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The efficacy of modifying tax laws to allow exporters to make
border adjustments is subject to debate. One side of the debate, often
cited in the literature, argues that tax laws should not be changed.
Supporters of this argument note that border tax adjustments do not
have long-term effects on competition because assuming perfectly
general tax regimes, competitive advantage will be eliminated by the
movement of exchange rates, thereby eliminating any cost advantage
gained by a change in the tax burden on internationally traded
goods. 49 More specifically, the currency subjected to direct taxation
will depreciate relative to the currency from a country using indirect
50
taxation, thus eliminating any competitive advantage.
Exchange rates do not immediately change in response to
changing economic circumstances, preventing markets from
eliminating the advantages gained should the United States adopt a
consumption tax. Economic data suggest that "exchange rates
are ... persistent," having "half-lives ... of four to five years". 5 1 The
implication of this data is that at least short-term economic benefit
can be gained from switching from a personal income tax to a general
consumption tax.

III.

INEFFICIENT MARKETS

Attraction of foreign investment is not a zero-sum game and can
benefit both capital-importing countries and capital-exporting
countries.5 2 Capital-importing countries benefit from increases in
investment capital, tax revenue, employment, and the "introduction
of new skills and technology. '5 3 Capital-exporting countries can
expect returns on the investment in "the form of repatriated profits,
intellectual property royalties and similar payments. ' 54 Returns on
foreign capital investment have become more important as
globalization has increased the flows of transnational investment; in
2004, investors globally invested almost ten trillion dollars of foreign

49.
Id. at 742-43; Alan J. Auerbach, The Future of Fundamental Tax Reform,
87 AM. ECON. REV. 143, 144 (1997); Harry Johnson & Mel Krauss, Border Taxes,
Border Tax Adjustments, ComparativeAdvantage, and the Balance of Payments, 3 CAN.
J. ECON. 595, 601 (1970).
50.
Gillis et al., supra note 48, at 741.
51.
Michael B. Devereux, Real Exchange Rates and Macroeconomics:Evidence
and Theory, 30 CAN. J. ECON. 773, 795 (1997).
52.
EASSON, supra note 3, at 12-13. But see Joel Slemrod, Tax Principlesin an
International Economy, in WORLD TAX REFORM: CASE STUDIES OF DEVELOPED AND

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11 (Michael J. Boskin & Charles E. McLure, Jr. eds., 1990).
53.

EASSON, supra note 3, at 14.

54.

Id. at 13.
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direct investment. 55 Despite research consistently showing that
governmental interventions into the free market create bad results,
.56
legislatures consistently ignore the warning
A common concern is that tax competition will cause a "race to
the bottom, reducing the amount of tax revenue, and therefore,
reducing the supply of public goods below the optimum amount. ''5 7 In
response to this perceived threat, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), a non-governmental
organization encompassing thirty countries that addresses economic
issues, attempted to use its market power to force alleged tax
havens-usually smaller developing nations, into changing their tax
structure-with the threat of sanctions or the cancellation of trade
treaties. 58 Although so far ineffective, individual OECD members
have threatened the cessation of all financial ties with non-complying
nations. 59
The root of the tax competition debate is largely a matter of
conflicting social policy preferences. For example, one point of view
represented by Charles Tiebout, a mid-twentieth century economist,
hypothesized that competition makes government "more efficient and
more responsive to the needs and desires of their residents," and thus
tax competition is desirable.6 0 Tiebout's insight into governmental
competition continues to have adherents and embodies a preference
for efficiency. It also provides a philosophical counterpoint to authors,
such as Professor Avi-Yonah, who disfavor tax competition because it
might affect the ability of governments to spend as they desire,
6
potentially endangering European type social models. '
From a government's perspective, tax incentives can bring
economic gains to specific countries, but countries that win a bidding
war for foreign investment can discover that gains can be

55.
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report,
FDI Database, http://www.unctad.org/sections/ditedir/docs/wir2005_outstock-en.xls
(run search for outflows, by home region and economy, 1970-2003).
56.
See EASSON, supra note 3,at 85.
57.
John Douglas Wilson, Trade, Capital Mobility, and Tax Competition, 95 J.
POL. ECON. 835, 836 (1987).

58.
Akiko Hishikawa, The Death of Tax Havens?, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
389, 401-02 (2002); Benjamin R. Hartman, Coercing Cooperation from Offshore
Financial Centers: Identity and Coincidence of International Obligations Against
Money Laundering and Harmful Tax Competition, 24 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 253,

264 (2001).
59.
Hartman, supra note 58, at 263-64.
60.
Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International
Tax Competition, 89 GEO. L.J. 543, 545 (2001); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 416, 424 (1956).

61.
Compare Perroni & Scharf, supra note 18, at 134 (asserting tax competition
can "raise welfare"), with Avi-Yonah, supra note 9, at 1629 (finding that tax havens
endanger social programs).
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nonexistent. The theory is that, in a bidding war, countries face an
increased risk of overestimating the benefit of attracting the foreign
investment by bidding too much. 62 Any welfare gained by attracting
foreign investment would therefore be spent as it is gained.
Although the taxation of investment creates income for a
governmental entity, such taxation also acts as a disincentive for
investment. 63 Would-be investors will substitute untaxed uses on
their income for the investment, thereby reducing the level of
investment below what would have existed if there was no tax on
investment. 64 Because investment would be below the free-market
equilibrium, a deadweight loss greater than the amount of
governmental tax revenues would be created. 65 Basic economics
provides that a dollar now is worth more than a dollar in the future.
Therefore interest has to be paid to encourage investors to delay the
consumption of current dollars. Because taxes reduce an investor's
rate of return, the savings rate is necessarily lower than the savings
rate under a tax system where investment is not taxed. The use of
distortionary taxation thereby provides relative gains but destroys
potential economic gains.
Although tax competition has lowered the taxation of capital,
this Note hopes to draw a distinction between general tax reductions
and specific tax incentives. Specifically-tailored tax incentives result
in two types of inefficiencies. 66 First, investors and savers are induced
to allocate assets based on the tax incentives rather than on the most
productive use of the assets. 67 Second, competition between those who
receive incentives and those who do not receive incentives is
distorted. 68 By increasing waste, these efficiency losses necessarily
offset part of the gains tax competition creates through lower capital
tax rates.
Tax incentives can also cause harm in more indirect ways.
Incentives, for instance, can lead to a waste of governmental revenue.
While incentives attract investment and savings that would
otherwise not occur in a country, they also unnecessarily benefit

62.

See Clayton P. Gillette, Business Incentives, Interstate Commerce, and the

Commerce Clause, 82 MINN. L. REV. 447, 451 (1997).

63.

David F. Bradford, The Case for a Personal Consumption Tax, in WHAT

SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE 75, 96 (Joseph A. Peachman ed., 1980).

See John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type
64.
Income Tax Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental
Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2095, 2105 (2000) (describing how an individual might
replace leisure for work under high income taxation, although recognizing that income
taxation may cause a reverse effect and individuals might work harder to increase
income to reach the level of income the individual would have had without an income
tax).
65.
Id. at 2106.
66.
EASSON, supra note 3, at 107.
67.
See id. (applying idea to investment).
Id.
68.
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investment and savings that would have occurred in a country
without an incentive, a phenomenon referred to by economists as the
redundancy rate.6 9 Assuming that countries wish to use tax revenues
effectively, redundant tax expenditures conflict with this goal by
paying an investor to invest unnecessarily. 70 To reduce the amount of
public monies wasted, countries can tailor tax incentives to benefit
71
only the investors that are thought to need the incentive to invest.
The international allocation of investment is inefficient. In a taxless
world, decisions on capital allocation are based on the expected
returns to an investment. Taxation, however, can introduce other
factors into the decision-making process. Compared to a taxless
72
world, favorable taxation attracts capital to less productive uses.
For example, favorable taxation can incentivize investments that
would not otherwise be made. At the international level, differing tax
rates can affect the "flow of goods and services, of factors of
production, and the choices of individuals to reside and consume in
one country or another. '73 By altering such preferences, differential
taxation can change the pattern of trade by influencing the placement
of production facilities, the flow of financial capital, and the
movement of labor. 74 Tax incentives create an overall loss to social
welfare because the benefits gained through tax incentives do not
completely offset the efficiency costs. The coordination of worldwide
taxation can create fiscally neutral taxation where investment
decisions would not be affected by tax policy. 75 For example,
neutrality could be achieved if every country adopted a retail sales
tax. 76 Although tax coordination might be economically beneficial
under some circumstances, other types of coordination can insulate
governments from tax competition, thereby removing a limitation to
77
government budgets.
Increasing globalization provides countries the increased ability
78
to make economic gains through the use of comparative advantage.
Comparative advantage assumes that countries will focus on

69.
Id. at 75-76.
70.
Id. at 75. The redundancy rate can be reduced by targeting tax incentives,
which in turn increases the distortionary effects. Id. at 76.
See id. at 106.
71.
72.
Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles,
Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1357, 1381

(2001) (describing the definition of global efficiency used by Peggy Musgrave).
73.
Peggy B. Musgrave, International Coordination Problems of Substituting
Consumption for Income Taxation, in TAX POLICY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 415, 418

(2002).
74.

Id.

75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 419.
Id. at 427.
Ballard, supra note 23, at 124; id. at 421.
Mintz, supra note 8, at 1293.

530

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39:519

economic activities that provide the greatest returns. 79 Thus, by
focusing on their respective comparative advantages, two countries
can maximize their combined economic outputs. 8 0 By providing tax
incentives to attract international savings and investment, countries
reduce the welfare benefits provided by comparative advantage. As
previously noted, tax incentives can induce private actors to alter
their investment behavior.8 1 Behavior modification comes at a cost,
however, because tax policy creates an inefficient allocation of
82
resources where the relative costs of producing goods are changed.
Changes to the relative cost of production can make the production of
tax-favored goods relatively more profitable than in a tax-free world.
Thus, distortionary tax policies can incentivize investment in taxfavored activities at the expense of the most productive investment
that would occur in the tax-free world.8 3 Because relatively more
resources are used to produce tax-favored goods, the excess resources
used-called deadweight loss-are wasted, resulting in an overall loss
of wealth. 84 At the international level, distortionary tax policy can
create "dramatic, permanent shifts in the international pattern of
specialization and trade. ''8 5 Elimination of distortionary tax policy
would lead to a worldwide increase in wealth.
More concretely, empirical evidence provides that international
investment is highly elastic and therefore greatly influenced by tax
differentials.8 6 A cross-sectional study by Grubert and Mutti of fivehundred multinational corporations with locations in sixty countries
shows that, in both the short and long term, low taxes are the most
significant factor in explaining the locations of multinational
investment.8 7 The study concludes that 19% of worldwide capital is
allocated in response to taxes, signifying the existence of large
worldwide welfare losses.8 8 The movement of such vast amounts of
capital to tax incentives is another indication of the need to reduce
losses to inefficiency through the adoption of an economically-neutral
general tax such as a general sales tax.
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Id.
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Baxter, supranote 12, at 734.
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IV.

NEEDED CHANGE? A CONSUMPTION ALTERNATIVE

Most of the world's consumption taxes are a form of a valueadded tax (VAT). 89 Generally implemented, a VAT is a single tax paid
at each stage of production, calculated by subtracting the value of
purchases from the value of sales. 90 A VAT is not a general tax;
rather, there are usually many businesses exempt from paying
VAT. 9 1 More specifically, there are two generally recognized
exemptions to the VAT: one is for items legislatively exempted, and
the other is for tax credits to offset VAT payments made during
earlier stages of production. 92 A credit is provided for exported items
because the typical VAT is a territorial system whereas exports are
sold extraterritorially. 9 3 By providing an export credit, policymakers
hope to make goods more competitive abroad. As noted above,
although currency values adjust in the long run to cancel out any
competitive advantage, evidence indicates that in the short run,
instituting a border adjustment should create a short-run
94
competitive advantage for the United States.
The adoption of a consumption tax will benefit the United States
because it will induce positive behavioral changes at the international
level. Behavioral economics posits that the income tax is perceived as
penalizing hard work, punishing ambition, and constraining
freedom. 95
In contrast to an income tax, consumption taxes
encourage saving and investment. 96 Other related features of a
consumption tax include a broad tax base and increased simplicity
that will reduce the drag of inefficient compliance costs. 97 The actual
behavioral results of tax reform are highly debated and economic
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Arnold C. Harberger, Principles of Taxation Applied to Developing
Countries: What Have We Learned?, in WORLD TAx REFORM: CASE STUDIES OF
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 25, 27-28 (Michael J. Boskin & Charles E.
McLure eds., 1990).
90.
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Harberger, supra note 89, at 30.
92.
Hunter R. Clark, Amy Bogran & Hayley Hanson, The WTO Ruling on
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(2001).
93.
Id.
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95.
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Morality of Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND.
L.J. 161 (1994).
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System (Mar. 3, 2005), http://www.federalreserve.govboarddocs/testimony/2005/
[hereinafter Greenspan Testimony].
97.
Id.
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models do not provide consistent predictions, but some general
observations can be made. For example, under any consumption tax
proposal currently under serious consideration, businesses would no
longer have to pay taxes on income earned outside the United States
and foreign investment would no longer be taxed. 98 In addition to
reducing administrative costs of businesses and investors, a
consumption tax would eliminate business and investors concerns
about repatriated profit, which are taxed under the current system. 99
Most consumption tax proposals would only lightly tax capital and
would incentivize shifting income from high tax areas to the United
States.10 0 Domestic taxation problems, however, would be created
under certain consumption tax proposals, such as the VAT, because,
internationally, income is not defined consistently. 10 ' Businesses
would pressure Congress not to recognize certain types of income as
foreign source income where foreign countries are not likely to
recognize the income as such, allowing certain income-producing
10 2
activities to go untaxed.
In contrast to the VAT-style taxation of business inputs, sales
taxes, as implemented in U.S. states, are focused on the sale of
goods.' 0 3 As applied in the United States, sales taxes are not general
taxes. Individual states usually exempt the sale of services, food,
housing, and clothing from sales taxation.10 4 State governments also
vary their intrastate rates of taxation, which increases the costs of
administering the system. l0 5
Furthermore, as noted earlier,
regarding income taxation, providing tax-favored status (such as
exemption on any good or service from taxation) shrinks the tax base,
which requires higher levels of taxation to collect a particular amount
of tax revenue.
The use of a national sales tax as proposed in the Fairtax Plan is
a better system than traditional state sales taxes. As with all
consumption taxation systems, savings and investment are exempt
from taxation. 0 6 But rather than applying to the sale of all goods, the
10 7
Fairtax Plan only applies to the sale of new goods and services.
Secondary market transactions are exempt from taxation, thereby
preventing double taxation. 10 8 Unlike the current U.S. tax system,
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the Fairtax Plan does not grant taxpayers any exemptions from the
sales tax on finished new goods and services.10 9 Because the Fairtax
Plan taxes services, it is broader than the typical state sales tax,
which does not tax services. Business inputs, which include "business
to business purchases for the production of goods and services," are
not subject to taxation. 110 By only taxing retail goods and services,
the lack of disclosure caused by embedded taxes on purchases of
goods and services is eliminated."' Embedded taxes result from the
taxation of businesses, which pass the costs of taxation onto the
owners, consumers, or employees either through lower profits, higher
prices, or reduced employee wages. 112 With the VAT, taxes are
embedded in all non-exempt goods. To the extent that taxes are borne
by consumers, removing taxes on business inputs, a feature of the
Fairtax Plan, makes consumers aware of the full extent of the
governmental tax burden.
Consumption taxes are more efficient than income taxes and
increase the aggregate amount of savings and investment, resulting
in long-term welfare benefits. Though consumption taxes-as with
any tax-negatively affect a country's economy, the negative effects
are substantially less than those under an income tax. 113 Despite
differences in the estimates of aggregate benefits, most economic
models show that consumption taxes create fewer distortions than
income taxes. 1 14 For example, one of the distortions created by income
taxation and addressed by consumption taxation is the disincentive to
save. 115 Negatively stated, income taxes encourage spending because
income taxes punish savers by lowering rates of return on
investment. 116 In contrast, by exempting savings and investment
from taxation, consumption taxes encourage saving and investment,
the existence of which is necessary for economic growth. 117 Therefore
a transition from an income to consumption tax reduces the tax
burden on growth and welfare, setting the stage for economic
118
growth.
If the United States changed its tax structure to a consumption
tax, foreign investment would increase in the short run. Foreign
investors would want to benefit from zero taxation on the return of
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110.
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their investment, thereby increasing the real return on investments
in the United States. 1 19 Professor Dale Jorgenson's model shows that
a consumption tax would create an increase in investment of 4.9%, in
120
real terms, relative to investment rates under the U.S. income tax.
The investment increase, however, is estimated to decline over a
period of ten years, until the relative investment advantage is
1 21
completely eroded.
Although the economic benefits from adopting a consumption tax
are eventually lost, the short-term influx of investment into the
United States would instigate change of its borders. The United
States is a large country both economically and demographically, and
as such, is more attractive to foreign investment relative to smaller
countries with similar and sometimes more advantageous tax
codes. 122 For instance, some studies suggest that following a
unilateral change to a consumption tax like the Fairtax Plan, the
increased investment in the United States would cause Europe to lose
an estimated five percent of its capital stock. 123 A unilateral change
by the United States will put downward pressure on all countries to
lower their taxation of investment and savings. 12 4 Countries that do
not respond to the competitive pressure will risk a capital flight
similar to that which occurred when the United States eliminated the
withholding tax on foreigners in 1984.125

V. CRITICISMS OF CONSUMPTION TAXES AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

A. Consumption Taxation may be Unfairly Biased Toward Immobile
Sources
One criticism of consumption taxes is that they are unfairly
biased toward immobile sources such as labor. 126 Some critics argue
that because a sales tax is necessarily predicated on spending,
immobile taxpayers-such as the poor-are disproportionately
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affected because the purchase of necessities takes up a larger
percentage of their disposable income as compared to the rich, who
have more disposable income and are able to save more and
accumulate even more wealth. 12 7 Critics are also concerned about the
danger of placing excessive taxes on labor, finding that high taxes
correlate with low job creation, a disincentive to work, and the
driving of consumption overseas. 128 At the international level,
concern over the taxation of immobile sources is a partial repackaging
of the apprehension over international tax competition and the global
decline of taxes on savings and investment-the so-called "race to the
bottom."
The argument assumes that because countries are
frightened of losing foreign savings and investment, they will be less
likely to tax capital and the tax burden, once borne by capital, will be
shifted to labor. 129 As a result, because labor cannot be taxed without
limit, tax revenues will be smaller and will not equal the amount
needed to equal governmental expenditures, and in traditionally high
tax countries will endanger the "social consensus" regarding the
130
importance of the welfare state.
Assuming the criticism above is completely valid, its
applicability would be reduced through the adoption of the Fairtax
Plan, which includes no exemptions on the consumption of new goods
and services. 13 1 A broad tax-base ensures the lowest possible tax rate
by spreading the tax burden and reducing the distortionary and antigrowth effects of high consumption taxation. 132 By reducing
distortion, the Fairtax Plan will enable the United States economy to
grow at an increased rate. 133 Distortion is reduced because the
Fairtax Plan is a general tax, which does not tax-favor the
consumption of any new good or service. 134 Furthermore, the focus on
immobile sources is deceptive because implicit in the argument is
that taxes paid on savings and investment will not ultimately fall on
the consumer. This assumption is incorrect. Not only do such taxes
fall on business owners, they are passed down to consumers and
1 35
workers through higher prices and lower compensation.
The idea that consumption taxes truly shift the tax burden from
capital to labor is overstated. As previously noted, the incidence of
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capital taxation also falls on labor and consumers; support for this
theory has existed for over fifty years. 13 6 Corporate taxes passed on to
workers cause double damage because workers, in addition to
receiving lower pay, pay the corporate tax again at the retail level.
The approximate level of tax shifting is uncertain, with estimates of
tax shifting ranging around 30% in the 1950s to estimates of
businesses passing on 100% of their tax burden in the 1970s. 1 37 Even
assuming the most conservative estimate of corporate tax shifting is
correct, tax shifting exists at substantial levels. Although some
concern about shifting the tax burden to labor is reasonable, the
criticism as generally expressed is hyperbolic.
B. Are Efficiency Gains a Myth?
Some academics question the estimated efficiency gains of
consumption taxation. 138 For example, Professor Julie Roin argues
that the literature generally supports the idea that both income and
consumption taxes share the same base, and that the difference
between the two is that only two types of capital are favored under a
consumption tax: (1) the riskless real return, which is the interest
rate equivalent to the interest rate provided by a riskless asset; and
(2) the inflation premia, which is the extra interest paid by a
borrower to account for expected inflation.' 39 Because the tax bases
are similar, the only existing efficiency gains would be in the retaxation of accumulated capital, which already would have been
140
taxed under an income tax.
To support her argument, Professor Roin cites Professors
Bankman and Fried, who found that little is gained from switching to
a consumption tax because new capital investment continues to be
taxed in three out of five categories. 14 1 The categories of financial
capital are: (1) riskless real returns, (2) inflation premia, (3) marginal
returns to risk, (4) supernormal returns, and (5) returns on human
capital. 142 In their analysis, Bankman and Fried assume an ideal
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income tax, with full loss offsets, stable investment prices, and the
ability to increase portfolio risk nearly costlessly. 143 Full loss offsets
are where investors are allowed to deduct losses to investment from
other income. 144 Given those assumptions, Bankman and Fried argue
that when an ideal income tax is compared to an ideal consumption
tax, the consumption tax will only avoid taxing capital investment
14 5
related to the inflation premium and the risk premium.
Bankman and Fried illustrate that under an "ideal" consumption
tax or "ideal" income tax, some marginal investments are
discouraged. 146 They provide that either tax system would increase
the marginal cost of business, making some investments unprofitable
that would otherwise be profitable in an untaxed world. 14 7 Although
Bankman and Fried's criticism is accurate as applied to some
consumption tax proposals, the Fairtax Plan avoids discouraging
investment by exempting human capital from taxation. 148 By
exempting business inputs, no difference in the level of investment
149
would exist under the Fairtax Plan or in an untaxed world.
C. World Reaction
1. Foreign Response: Potential Effect on Tax Treaties
Some critics, such as Avi-Yonah, are also concerned that
switching to a consumption tax would negatively affect the United
States because of the negation of tax treaties. Tax treaties form the
core of international policy on taxation. 150 The system of tax treaties
began in the 1920s and its main function is to eliminate double
taxation. 15 1 Globally, there are more than 1,200 tax treaties. 15 2 The
concern is that because consumption taxes do not tax income from
savings and investment, double taxation would cease to be a concern,
and therefore would cripple the global tax treaty system by making it
irrelevant. 153 By withdrawing from the tax treaties, other countries
can and will attempt to capture the tax revenue forgone by the
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United States by taxing U.S. foreign investment multiple times. 154
Avi-Yonah argues that because capital, and therefore part of the tax
base in a territorial system, will flow from other countries into the
United States, countries will begin to tax worldwide returns on
investment, transferring the forgone tax revenue in the United States
into their own coffers. 155 He further argues that foreign countries are
punished through losing investment to the United States as long as
the additional taxation was only on the "windfall" profits provided to
156
investors by the United States.
Although it is difficult to predict the actions of foreign countries,
concern over an international backlash is not warranted. While the
"core function" of U.S. tax treaties might be superfluous, the existence
of one variable is unlikely to predict another country's foreign
policy. 1 67 Rather, the decisions of any government stem from a
multitude of factors. For instance, a foreign county or bloc of
countries might be too concerned about economic retaliation should
they begin a "tax war." Furthermore, beginning a tax war based on
the U.S. domestic policy is not justifiable because there is no
international tax organization and no international law to give a
foreign country input over another country's domestic taxation
158
policy.
2. Foreign Response: Foreign Changes at the Domestic Level
Professor Avi-Yonah believes that, should the United States act
unilaterally in changing its tax system, there will be a negative
international response, which has the potential to mute any long
term advantage gained by the United States. Countries, especially
those in Europe, will be concerned with the spillover effects of the
United States' adoption of a consumption tax. 159 Worldwide, some
countries will face pressure to stop taxing investment, while others
will try to capture the extra investment income not taxed by the
United States. 160 Countries will be able to capture the United States'
source profits because residence countries retain the right to tax
income that goes untaxed in source countries. 161 For example, the
OECD has historically adopted norms to tax profits earned on
investment and savings in low tax jurisdictions. 16 2 OECD member
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nations in particular might avoid losing investment by capturing the
United States' forgone taxes. 163 Professor Avi-Yonah suggests that by
eliminating deferral and cross-crediting, any windfall gained by
corporations investing in the United States will be eliminated, and
164
investment incentives will return to pre-consumption tax levels.
The incentive for tax avoidance will reduce the ability of other
countries to capture the tax revenues the United States would forgo
by switching to a consumption tax. Raising taxes will only raise the
payoff and therefore the incentive to avoid taxation. Contrary to AviYonah's position, investors and savers alike will change their
investment behavior, structuring their assets to maximize exempt
income in the United States and minimize taxes paid on investment
165
and savings in other countries.
The potential utility of more efficient international capital
taxation is greater than the utility of accommodating the desire of
other foreign government's to have inefficient tax systems. If foreign
countries respond to the United States' adoption of a consumption tax
by reducing their own tax rates, such an action would reduce the
incentive of foreign corporations and foreign individuals to transfer
assets to the United States. 166 Convergence of international
investment taxation, due to competition rather than collusion, will
create several mutually beneficial outcomes, including a worldwide
increase in investment, reduction of resources spent on avoiding
taxes, and the reduction of deadweight loss. 16 7 Thus, a worldwide
increase in wealth would be earned.
D. Avoidance
1. Black Market
One source of black market activity is the manner and rate of
taxation. Most economic studies find a material link between high
taxes and high levels of black market activity. 168 Black market
activity is economic activity completed in a manner that avoids tax or
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regulation. 169 While the ceritral aspect of black market activitytrade-is not bad in and of itself, black markets are associated with
outcomes that governments try to minimize, such as reducing tax
revenues, narrowing the tax base, and acting as an outlet for
organized crime. Rampant black market activity creates competitive
pressure for others to avoid taxes to be able to offer the competitive
lower price, which, in turn, lowers tax revenue. 170 The problems
associated with black markets require more than strict enforcement
of laws; curtailing black market activity requires a tax system that
will reduce attempted black market activity by creating a perception
of fairness.
Changing the U.S. tax code to a consumption tax will potentially
create an increase in black market activity. Indirect taxes such as
those under the Fairtax Plan provide incentives to sellers to undercut
competitors by avoiding the sales tax. 171 Under the Fairtax Plan, the
opportunity to reap large profits exists where the buyer and seller
172
avoid the sales tax and split the tax savings between themselves.
Facing the danger of being undercut by black market activity,
173
competition might become more difficult for non-avoiders.
Cigarette smuggling in the United States is a classic example of the
incentive that consumption taxes give to black marketers. A case
study completed in 1993 revealed that maximum variation in
cigarette prices in the United States was 63.5 cents per pack and that
as early as 1977, smuggling cost high-tax counties 391 million
174
dollars.
The possible incentive for black market activity should serve as a
warning for legislatures to keep taxation of consumption at a broad
base and as low as possible. While there are always compliance costs
in enforcing a taxation system, it is essential to reduce enforcement
175
costs by ensuring that the tax implemented is perceived as fair.
Perception is important because taxes perceived as fair have higher
176
voluntary compliance than taxes perceived as unfair.
The success or failure of tax systems correlates to the honesty of
the taxpayer and the taxpayers' perceptions of the tax system. 177 Fair
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tax laws promote a perception in the taxpayer that obedience to the
laws is morally grounded, as is punishment for violating those
laws. 178 Illustrating this principle is the fact that reported income in
the United States' 70% tax bracket in 1917-1918 fell by 46% after a
high tax rate was instituted. 179 This decrease was in large part
attributable to the perceived unfairness and excessiveness of the tax
rate. 8 0 Put differently, a tax system that is perceived as fair will
result in fewer instances of tax avoidance. Should tax arbitrage
become a serious problem, the United States could bear significant
compliance costs.

VI. CONCLUSION

Advocating change in the international norms of taxation
requires recognition that taxation is about more than economic
efficiency. 181 For example, the fairness of the tax burden played a
large role in the different gradations of income tax in the United
States. 8 2 The issue of fairness even played a role in League of
Nations meetings on international taxation.18 3 At the international
level, however, given the increased mobility that globalization has
given capital, esoteric notions of equity seem less relevant because of
the high economic stakes.
This Note recognizes that there are many domestic issues that
surround the adoption of a national sales tax. Consumption taxes
dampen demand for the taxed goods and services; therefore, adopting
the Fairtax Plan would result in a partial tradeoff, providing a
preference for more investment and savings relative to more
consumption. 8 4 Professor Michael Graetz noted that "if economic
efficiency were the sole goal of tax policy, we would tax wages or
consumption, but not income. '18 5 Although in the long run an
efficient system of international taxation would leave everyone better
off, Graetz's insight parallels an insight of John Maynard Keynes: "in
18 6
the long run, we're all dead."'
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A general problem with tax research is that it focuses on ideal
models. Other than the VAT and a few versions of sales taxation,
most of the ideal models advocated by economists and tax attorneys
are untested and would certainly create unforeseen results. Further,
as central governments have not shown the capability to resist
tinkering with the tax system, ideal tax systems will assuredly not
remain ideal. 187 The U.S. tax system has careened between the poles
of economic efficiency and benefiting special interests, and lawmakers
may very well find ways to subvert the benefits of the Fairtax Plan
for short term political gain. l88 As noted by former Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan, reform of the U.S. tax code will require
assessment of "tradeoffs between complexity, fairness, and economic
growth.' 189 The next step in analyzing individual tax proposals is to
more thoroughly study the separate issues surrounding the Fairtax
proposal.
Although contentious domestic issues remain, at the
international level, the potential short- and long-term economic gains
of adopting a consumption tax in the United States enormously
outweigh the potentially negative aspects of its adoption. In
particular, the Fairtax Plan addresses several of the valid criticisms
of consumption taxation. Internationally, the United States' adoption
of the Fairtax Plan will benefit other countries. By putting additional
pressure on countries to reduce taxes on international savings and
investment, assets will flow more like they would in a free market.
Under the Fairtax Plan, the most productive investment
opportunities will receive more assets, reducing waste caused by tax
incentives. Although some countries, such as those in the European
Union, are skeptical about changing the status quo, these states
should and likely will ultimately embrace a system that will enhance
their ability to create wealth.
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Cf. Greenspan Testimony, supra note 96 (describing how the U.S.
government changed the tax rates shortly after the 1986 tax reform passed).
188.
Cf. id.
189. Id.
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